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Economics is now central to health policy decision making, within government departments and 
the National Health Service. We examine how and why a health economics academic unit – the 
Centre for Health Economics (CHE) at the University of York, England – was created in 1983, 
funded and commissioned to provide research evidence to the British government, specifically the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) and its successors. Building on the knowledge 
transfer literature, we document the origins of this relationship and the different strategies deployed 
by successive governments and researchers. This paper demonstrates the value of historical 
methodologies such as oral history and textual analysis that highlight the limitations of existing 
knowledge transfer theories, by foregrounding the role of politics via the construction of individual 
relationships between academics and policy-makers.
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key messages
• Critically analyses the development of knowledge transfer between British health economics 
academic units and government health policy-makers.
• Develops knowledge transfer theory by demonstrating a greater role for politics and 
individual relationships.
• Provides a first detailed case study of how a British academic unit for health economics 
developed a relationship with a government department.
Introduction
Since its emergence in the 1960s in the United Kingdom (UK), health economics 
– or economics as applied to health – has sought to influence health policy-making, 
especially through mobilising ideas of scarce resources, supply-demand and cost-
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effectiveness. Key successes include the Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) concept 
developed with Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) funding in the 
1970s, the 1989–1991 National Health Service (NHS) internal market reforms, and 
the creation of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (as NICE was initially 
known) in 1999.
The relationship between government and health economics research – here 
understood primarily as the academic community – has changed significantly since 
the 1960s. This paper focuses on the creation of a health economics academic unit, 
the Centre for Health Economics (CHE) at the University of York in 1983. It was 
supported by government funding through the DHSS (which became the Department 
of Health (DH) in 1988, and the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) in 
2018), from an initial £20,000 in 1971 to almost £1.4 million in 2016–2017. CHE 
staff provided health policy evidence and advice to civil servants and government 
ministers in the DHSS/DH. Their emerging relationships were mirrored by other 
academic disciplines that, by the 1970s, were routinely called upon in the formation 
of health policy, especially clinical research and epidemiology. In 1973 in England 
and Wales, there were ten designated academic research units and 42 institutional 
groups with DHSS contracts (McLachlan, 1973), spanning interests and disciplines 
as varied as child psychology and domestic violence.
This paper analyses how this specific government-research relationship developed. It 
draws on primary data from archive documents (from CHE, academics’ personal papers, 
and the National Archives), 44 semi-structured interviews with key civil servants and 
academics, and a witness seminar on the development of health economics. It builds 
on the knowledge transfer (KT) and evidence-based policy-making literatures to 
examine the changing relationships and strategies deployed by both sides which led 
to significant changes in health policy construction over a 30-year period. It highlights 
the gap in existing KT theories through their lack of engagement with chronological 
and political factors, and demonstrates how their inclusion produces a more holistic 
analytical framework and the importance of focusing on different aspects of KT, from 
relations, to tools and strategies. 
The paper first sets the context of the increasing influence of health economics 
from the 1960s, and identifies useful KT literature. The research methods and case 
selection are outlined before presenting the key case-study findings. It concludes 
with a call for a broader platform for knowledge transfer theory, where historical 
and political analysis are formal components, and demonstrates how this illuminates 
the centrality of politics (expressed as power plays over rules, identities and other 
objects) in knowledge transfer.
Background: the rise of health economics
British economists have been successful in permeating health policy-making arenas 
since the early 1970s, as illustrated in Table 1 below which tracks some of the 
key events. The influence of economics grew within the UK government in the 
mid-1960s. In 1964, a Treasury unit was established – the Government Economic 
Service (GES) – dedicated to hiring and dispatching economists across government 
departments.  In 1968, the Economic Advisers’ Office (EAO) was established within 
the DHSS to advise administrators and politicians on economics, initially on social 
security policy and, from 1970, on health. The EAO not only hired economists to 
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advise DHSS policy-makers, but it also advocated for DHSS funding for a number 
of health economics academic projects and welcomed economics graduates on 
placements and secondments. 
Health economics gained influence with policy-makers through some of its key 
proponents such as Alan Williams, Tony Culyer and, later, Alan Maynard; and several 
who focused their interests on Scotland including Roy Weir, Gavin Mooney and 
Elizabeth Russell. Via various contacts with government and other organisations, 
these economists built a network of influence with policy-makers, applied for DHSS 
Key Academic activity Year Key Government Activity
1961 Publication of the Plowden Report on the 
Control of Public Expenditure
Creation of the University of York;
The Institute of Social and Economic 
Research (ISER) is created at York
1964
Alan Williams seconded to the Treasury 
(1966–1968);
York receives £45,000 from the Nuffield 
Provincial Hospital Trust (NPHT)
1966 Creation of the Government Economic 
Service (GES)
1967 Publication of the Fulton Report on the 
Home Civil Service
1968 Creation of the Economic Advisers’ Office 
(EAO);
The Ministry of Health becomes the 
Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS)
Economics of Medical Care Conference at 
York
1970 First two economists appointed in the EAO
York receives £20,000 from DHSS 1971 Publication of the Rothschild Report on 
the Organisation and Management of 
Government R&D
The Health Economists’ Study Group 
(HESG) holds its first meeting
1972 R&D money moved from the Medical 
Research Council to the DHSS
The Health Economics Research Unit is 
created at Aberdeen with Scottish Office 
grant
1977
Masters of HE created at York 1978
University Grant Committee is abolished 1979 Margaret Thatcher becomes Prime Minister
Creation of the Health Economics Research 
Group at Brunel 
1981 R&D money returned from DHSS to MRC
Centre for Health Economics (CHE) created 
at York with £478,000 grant
1983
1988 DHSS becomes the Department of Health 
(DH)
1989 Maynard develops idea of General 
Practitioner fundholding with David Willetts 
MP
1991 Creation of the NHS internal market
1999 Creation of NICE
Table 1:  Timeline of Health Economics Knowledge Transfer in the United Kingdom
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funding (Williams, 1985) and delivered knowledge transfer (KT) via briefings, the 
development of new health policy relevant tools and through established networks.
Knowledge transfer: a complex and confusing literature
The development of health economics provides a fertile territory in which to 
examine how knowledge is transferred between academia and government. KT 
first gained the attention of policy theorists in the 1950s (Evans et al, 1985; Lasswell, 
1951; Pierson, 1993) and was bolstered by the growth of evidence-based medicine 
for health policy (Cochrane, 1972). Government interest in social science research, 
including economics, intensified from the 1960s, with growing investment and use 
of research in policy and administration (Bulmer, 1987). The DHSS funded the 
creation of academic units to ‘produce knowledge’ by investigating a wide range of 
issues, including social epidemiology, industrial diseases and childhood health (Kogan 
et al, 2006). But the uptake of academic social science-based knowledge by the UK 
government in the 1960s–1970s was relatively limited compared to the United States. 
This can be linked to the particular culture of the British civil service and its reliance 
on internally produced knowledge, practical expertise and closed networks (Bulmer, 
1987; Maybin, 2014; Theakston, 1999). 
This knowledge transfer issue has been well-discussed in the literature, with varying 
problematisations and solutions. Yet few studies have looked at the specific role of 
academic research units set up by governments (for example, Louidor et al, 2008). A 
little more has been written on the question of KT in health economics, although 
few focus on academia-government KT (cf Armstrong et al, 2013; Léon et al, 2013). 
A small number of the 116 studies found on the topic of health economics KT are 
worth noting. For example, Jacobsen et al problematise the structure of academia, 
explaining that transfer could be promoted by the development of specific internal 
structures such as ‘dedicated units… with [a] mandate to engage specific user groups 
or specific topics’ (Jacobsen, 2004; also Coburn, 1998). Although not dealing with 
research units specifically, Ettelt et al’s (2013) paper on the setting-up of a DH-funded 
rapid-response unit to provide international healthcare comparisons is interesting for 
its discussion of the barriers to policy-research linkage. They explain that structures 
are required to facilitate KT and increase research-government interactions. They 
argue that such structures can help build trust and grow the credibility of researchers, 
although risks may include increased demands on time and resources, mismatch of 
timelines and incentives, and a lack of institutional support and organisational culture 
to sustain the exchange. This structure was seen as a one-way transfer from research to 
DH, where policy-makers would ‘tap into’ the researchers’ knowledge and network 
as and when needed for quick policy responses. Although they mention ‘policy 
research units funded by the Department’ as important, they do not discuss these in 
detail (Ettelt et al, 2013, 249).
Hanney and colleagues (2003) helpfully review the literature on the utilisation 
of health research in policy-making. They explain that despite all the research-
government links that exist, policy-makers still tend to make decisions in which 
research/evidence plays little direct role. They consider the ‘[d]evelopment of long-
term research centres focusing on particular topics [as] one of the potentially strongest 
ways health service research can take action to increase the possibility of research 
being used to inform policy’ (Hanney et al, 2003, 15). Although Hanney et al discuss 
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epistemic communities and knowledge brokers, they do not discuss specific units, 
focusing instead on the national level. Internal brokerage is flagged as important in 
the case of health economics: the hiring of economists within government appears 
to have impacted – positively and negatively – on the development of these research 
units and their influence on health policy-making. They explain that these internal 
brokers ‘might be officials with either a scientific or a professional or a policy-making 
background…  they may be able to assume the skills and value-set of boundary-
crossers and research enablers’ (Hanney et al, 2003, 17). For Ettelt et al (2013), the 
knowledge-brokering role of DH liaison officers was seen as key in commissioning 
and advising on research on behalf of ministers and keeping researchers informed 
of policy needs. 
Among the many classifications available, Smith offers a helpful categorisation of 
traditional KT theories (Smith, 2013). These include: a knowledge-driven model; a 
problem-solving model; a political model where politicians and policy-makers use 
research to support predetermined policies for political reasons; a tactical model where 
research is used to delay policy-making; a two-community model where policy-makers 
and researchers inhabit different worlds with different values and language leading to 
difficulty in informing policy (cf Caplan, 1979); and an enlightenment model where 
research, indirectly and long-term, influences policy-making by slow percolation 
(for example Weiss, 1977). This case study critically evaluates these frameworks and 
examines some of their advantages and drawbacks for understanding the history of 
KT in UK health economics. In particular, it builds on critiques of the use of expert 
knowledge in policy-making produced by Boswell (2009) and Parkhurst (Liverani 
et al, 2013; Parkhurst, 2017). 
Parkhurst notes that the ‘decidedly political nature of policy-making’ is often 
ignored by the literature on the uses of evidence in policy-making (Parkhurst, 2017, 
1). A systematic review of evidence use in health policy-making found that only 
six studies overtly analysed the political nature of the knowledge transfer process 
(Liverani et al, 2013). A study on Mexico’s health policy-making concluded that the 
hierarchical nature of an organisation could prevent the uptake of research evidence 
by barring the infiltration of evidence to higher echelons (Trostle et al, 1999). Liverani 
and colleagues’ review also highlights how the wider policy and political goals of 
a government may influence the uptake of evidence (Wilson and Sheldon, 2006), 
something highly relevant to the uptake of health economics during the 1970s and 
1980s UK government budget restrictions. Other studies on health knowledge transfer 
best fit into a tactical category, where evidence is used to discredit political opponents 
(for example Bowen et al, 2009) or to delay decision making (Gordon, 2006). 
We also mobilise Boswell’s (2009) three-part explanation of expert knowledge use in 
policy-making. She argues that, additionally to the traditional knowledge gap function 
– expert knowledge coming to fill a gap in policy-makers’ understanding of an issue 
and thus helping them formulate a solution – there are two more political rationales for 
policy-makers to call on expertise. First, it can be mobilised to legitimise a government 
agency, with the perception of such agency having access to expert knowledge 
bolstering its authority in the policy community. Second, expert knowledge can be 
mobilised to substantiate particular policy positions/preferences, undermining those 
of others. Here, the symbolic value of expertise such as economics can be helpful in 
a contested policy area such as healthcare (cf Markoff and Montecinos, 1993). In our 
analysis, we focus on different KT methods, from direct KT tools as policy briefings, 
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or the development of new health policy instruments to relationships, networks 
and other indirect aspects such as the provision of educational programmes. To us, 
these all form part of KT and are important objects of analysis in understanding the 
politics of KT.
Methods
This case study of the Centre for Health Economics (CHE) at the University of York, 
one of the earliest and most successful academic health economics units, forms part of 
a larger project on the role of expertise in British health policy formation since 1948. 
Based on the rich data collected from a number of sources, CHE’s work with UK 
government appeared complex and worthy of investigation. It raised the question of 
how this unit adapted to government demands for evidence and deployed strategies 
to address these in parallel with securing its own priorities (for example, funding) and 
values. Documents were identified in archives including the University of York (‘CHE 
Archives’ and ‘York Borthwick Archives’), DH (‘DH Burnley’), and the National 
Archives (‘TNA’ for ‘The National Archives’). Semi-structured oral history interviews 
were conducted with 44 participants, who were recruited via a snowballing method 
and from references obtained through document analysis. We constructed the sample 
to include academics, civil servants and other individuals such as medical professionals. 
This was done to counterbalance an existing bias in the health economics literature 
which presented a hagiographical account of the development of the discipline and 
some of its achievements. These interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed. 
For the purposes of this paper, they have been anonymised. They are referred to as 
CHE, DH, Academic (non-CHE) or EAO, to signify their primary working location, 
followed by a number. Two autobiographical pieces written by participants were 
helpful in adding personal narratives on the development of health economics. We 
also convened a witness seminar in October 2017 with 11 academics and government 
economists, recruited based on our knowledge of the field and other participants’ 
suggestions, to discuss the development of health economics in the UK, the history 
of CHE and KT with the DH. This event, which was recorded and transcribed, was 
useful in generating a more conflictual story, where ‘facts’ could be questioned and 
discussed by participants. 
This material was supplemented by secondary sources, especially historical studies 
of research management in government (for example, Kogan et al, 2006). These data 
were interpreted by us with the help of NVivo, drawing a multi-faceted picture via 
the construction of broad themes such as creation, actors, relations, occurrences of 
policy-making, resistance, competition from other advisory actors, based on the reading 
of each source. These themes, and later codes, were adapted as each source was read 
and re-read. This diversity of sources was essential to address two practical issues. First, 
only six relevant files from the Economic Adviser’s Office (EAO) in DHSS, which 
managed the relationship with the University of York unit, have been preserved at the 
National Archives. Second, the length of time that has passed since these events took 
place (1970s–1990s) meant that we could not rely solely on participants’ accurate 
recall. We therefore triangulated specific points between a range of interviews and 
archive sources. Different sources highlighted the possibility of multiple truths 
and interpretations of events, which removed the pressure on interviewee recall. 
The findings in the sections that follow are presented chronologically for ease of 
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understanding. However, the numbers and uses of KT strategies and the relationships 
analysed fluctuated across this period.
York economists and the Department of Health and Social Services: 
a special relationship?
The creation of the Centre for Health Economics (CHE) in 1983 at the University 
of York was part of a longer and wider process of knowledge transfer in UK health 
policy. In the 1970s, the central body (and largest funder) for clinical research 
commissioning in the UK was the Medical Research Council (MRC), created by 
the 1919 Ministry of Health Act and based on the Haldane principle that scientific 
research should be free from ministerial direction. By 1970, the MRC had a budget 
of £19.1 million (BMJ, 1970), although only a small proportion was dedicated to 
health services research (HSR). This arrangement emphasised a two-community 
approach to KT. In 1972–1973, a quarter of the MRC’s budget was transferred back 
to the DHSS and the Scottish Home and Health Department1 (SHHD) following 
the Rothschild Report (1971). This decision reflected the government’s view that 
the MRC privileged clinical research over HSR (especially social science-based 
research). Following Rothschild, it was decided that ‘applied’ research should be 
subject to a customer-contractor relation in which departments were better able to 
specify their needs, echoing Ettelt et al’s (2013) argument for the need for institutional 
support for KT. Thus in 1972–1973, the DHSS spent £15.4 million on research and 
development (R&D), including £2.9 million on ‘health and social care and public 
health services’ and over £8 million internally on  activities such as operational 
research and economics (McLachlan, 1973, xii).  The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals 
Trust (NPHT) think tank also played a key role in opening up HSR by providing 
funding to academic units. In 1971, this was equivalent to nearly a third of the DHSS’s 
R&D budget (McLachlan, 1971). 
In response to the 1971 Rothschild Report, the DHSS reformed how it managed 
and commissioned research. The DHSS employed a mix of designated units, 
programmes and other funding frameworks to ‘expand its research resources rapidly’ 
(McLachlan, 1971, 14). A quarter of the DHSS R&D health services budget was 
spent on individual external projects. The rest financed eight units and 40 longer-
term projects through seven-year funding agreements which had broad terms of 
reference to address an issue or develop particular methods. This was in addition to 
MRC-funded clinical research units. The 1972–1973 decision to transfer funds from 
the MRC to the DHSS was reversed in 1981, when some funding was returned to 
the MRC. This highlighted changing politics towards research and its role, especially 
social science research (Atkinson and Sheard, 2018; Jasanoff, 1994). 
The origins of the relationship
It is within this complex and changing web of DHSS R&D funding that the 
relationship with York economists developed in the late 1960s–early 1970s, 
culminating in the creation of the CHE in 1983. In comparison to other Whitehall 
departments, the DHSS was relatively late in developing an interest in economics. 
This delay has been attributed to the discomfort associated with mobilising economics 
concepts of cost, effectiveness and efficiency for health issues (Colvin, 1985; Pole, 1968). 
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Nevertheless, in 1966, the Ministry began exploring ‘possibilities of using cost/benefit 
or cost effectiveness analysis to estimate the value of specific projects or assess the 
merits of alternative schemes’ (TNA BN/155.4, NHS Economic Analysis). In 1967, 
a ministry-commissioned report advised on the recruitment of economists working 
on health and social security, leading to the creation of the Economic Adviser’s Office 
(EAO) in the DHSS in 1968 (TNA, BN/155.4, Osmond report, 16 May 1967). Two 
economists, David Pole and Jeremy Hurst, were appointed in 1970. 
In parallel, the newly-inaugurated University of York initiated an academic grouping 
around health economics. The Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) 
was created in 1964 within the Department of Economics at York. It was led by Jack 
Wiseman and included economists such as Alan Peacock, Tony Culyer, Alan Williams, 
and Bob Lavers. Its main research focus was on the application of economics to public 
sector issues including health. In 1966, it received a four-year £45,000 grant from the 
NPHT ‘for the facilitation of research activities concerned with social and economic 
problems of health’ (Tony Culyer report, Research in HE at the University of York, 
June 1971, 1, CHE archives). This facilitated the forging of a close relationship with 
the Nuffield Trust and later with DHSS. 
From the late 1960s, a number of factors highlighted by the KT literature were at 
play in building the relationship between DHSS and York economists. These include 
the presence of ‘brokers’ such as Professors Alan Peacock, Jack Wiseman and Alan 
Williams at York, and Gordon McLachlan, NPHT Secretary from 1956–1986, who 
was well-connected within government and research. These individuals were critical 
to bridging the two different worlds, as Hanney et al later also found (2003). Williams’ 
1966–1968 secondment to the Treasury is significant here. He worked on health 
matters within the Treasury’s Management Accounting Unit (MAU), which sought 
ways of achieving efficiency across government. He built a network with a number 
of key people such as Max Wilson, then a medical professional in DHSS working on 
centrally-financed programmes who later became a Senior Principal Medical Officer 
in DHSS (1972–1976). Williams collaborated with Wilson on the question of cost-
benefit analysis in health (Letter from AW to MW, 14 August 1969, CHE Archives, 
Early York Health projects box). He was also friends with Alec Cairncross, then 
head of the Government Economic Service. At the MAU, Williams was particularly 
interested in cost-effectiveness studies in health (Letter from AW to Robert Harcourt, 
Brunel University, 29 February 1968). From the early 1970s, another founding health 
economist, Alan Maynard, was seen as “very good at cultivating people and I think 
he cultivated more than was cultivated by. He was very good at cultivating Gordon 
[McLachlan] and Gordon was a very influential guy” (Tony Culyer, Witness seminar, 
in MacKillop et al, 2018). Here, the importance of networks in the circulation of 
knowledge in government was evident, echoing Freeman and Sturdy (2014).
Another key factor in forging a KT relationship between economists and 
government was growing interest in wider policy issues around controlling public 
expenditure and improving the effectiveness of government and its commissioning. 
The Fulton, Plowden and Rothschild reports all demonstrate the emerging focus 
on applied research and the need for evidenced/rational policy/decision making 
(Fulton, 1967; Plowden, 1961; Rothschild, 1971). There were also new government-
wide projects such as the Planning-Programme Budgeting-System (PPBS) where 
economists fitted naturally (Lowe, 1997; O’Hara, 2007). Government needed more 
economics experts: these were in short supply in the civil service, which drove the 
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search for them in academia (Allan, 2008). These changing government priorities and 
their call for new types of expertise illustrate Smith’s political model of KT where 
research supports pre-determined policies.
The 1970 York conference: a key moment in the birth of the relationship
A crucial moment in the evolution of this specific KT relationship was the ‘Economics 
of Medical Care’ conference held at the University of York in January 1970, in 
association with the DHSS. This meeting was attended by some of the most influential 
people in HSR such as Richard Cohen (Deputy CMO and later DHSS Chief 
Scientist), Max Wilson, Gillian Ford (a DHSS Senior Medical officer) and Archie 
Cochrane. Senior external economists attending included Denis Lees (a key proponent 
of a more neoliberal approach to healthcare), George Teeling-Smith from the think 
tank Office of Health Economics (OHE), and Malcolm Levitt from the Treasury. 
Gordon McLachlan from NPHT was also present. This event is an example of an 
attempt to bridge Caplan’s two-communities divide in KT. It established the research 
needs of government and the NHS and what an economics approach could bring to 
the debate. For York, it was an opportunity to propose a programme of economics 
research in health, to be funded by the DHSS, which simultaneously developed basic 
and applied knowledge in this new discipline. In June 1971, one of the key actors 
in the development of this relationship, Tony Culyer, wrote in a report for NPHT: 
From our point of view, a close liaison of the type we have in mind would 
keep us more or less constantly informed as to the current policy problems, 
while from the point of view of DHSS (in particular) we would hope to 
be able to take on ad hoc projects that may be felt appropriately handled 
outside the Department from time to time, to act as a resource for comment 
and discussion of internal papers. (Tony Culyer report, Research in HE at 
the University of York, June 1971, ISER, CHE archives ‘Early York Health 
Projects’ box)
From the DHSS perspective, there were some key issues that contributed to the push 
for building a KT relationship with York, notably the lack of economists in government 
working on health, which PJ Wormald, the DHSS Assistant Secretary, acknowledged:
Our own economic and research resources are, and are likely to be, too small 
to enable us to do all the work that will be needed. Augmentation from 
outside can only come from places where there is already a strong interest in 
health matters and the number of such places is very limited. York is probably 
the strongest and most enthusiastic. (TNA, MH/166.927, Economics of 
Medical Care, Note from Wormald to Mr Bourton, 20 May 1971)
The York research programme was finally agreed in 1971, following a meeting at the 
NPHT in London (CHE archives, Memo on health research at York with the DHSS, 
19 February 1971). There were subsequently a number of NPHT-hosted seminars 
that brought together York economists, DHSS staff and other protagonists. Culyer’s 
introduction to one of these highlighted the issue of relevance in KT, and emphasised 
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York’s desire to ‘make sure [to be] relevant to the interests of the DHSS’ by providing 
‘an academic service to DHSS’ in two ways:
 1. By undertaking ad hoc projects of an economic/statistical/econometric 
character in the short term, which are sufficiently self-contained to be 
detachable from the day to day work of the Economic Advisory Office [sic] 
and the Statistics and Research Division of DHSS and which could therefore 
be hived-off on to an external group.
 2. By offering an ‘instant’ review and comment capability on current DHSS 
problems and/or papers. (CHE archives, NPHT Seminar, Culyer introductory 
comments, July 1971)
This demonstrates that academics were already anticipating the government’s need 
for different knowledge types, with a preoccupation of relevance, timing, and 
presentation, which is in line with the KT enlightenment literature. As a result of these 
discussions ISER received £20,000 from DHSS for three key projects on waiting 
lists, social accounting of health and area resource allocation, and teaching hospitals 
(CHE Archives, Letter from JD Pole to Jack Wiseman, 3 August 1971). During the 
negotiations for this grant, it was clear that York was keen to grow its researcher 
pool. However, the DHSS was reluctant to support expansion plans, as illustrated by 
a note from JB Cornish, then a DHSS civil servant, later DHSS Head of Statistics 
and Research (1976–1978), which specified that the Department wanted ‘the present 
team to demonstrate their ability directly in project work’. The DHSS also wanted to 
be able to ‘choose the men [sic] we know rather than unknown yet to be recruited’ 
(TNA MH/166.927, Economics of Medical Care, Note from JB Cornish, 20 May 
1971). This highlights the Department’s cautiousness in this new KT enterprise. It 
was also illustrated by Dr Gillian Ford’s concern that York economists were not well 
enough connected to local clinicians and medical staff and that the Department should 
assist them (TNA MH/166.927, Economics of Medical Care, Letter to JD Pole, 21 
July 1971). Funding continued for individual projects such as the 1979–1980 grant of 
£59,331 (over three years) for a training programme in economics aspects of clinical 
practice (York Borthwick Archives, Vice Chancellor Report to Court 1979/80). 
The type of work requested from York economists varied from providing rapid 
advice and data, for example on use of teaching hospitals in response to a Public 
Accounts Committee request in 1971 (EAO 1), which aligns with the political and 
tactical KT models, to more in-depth and lengthy projects such as on community 
care led by Ken Wright at York from 1984 with discussion papers on the treatment 
of the mentally handicapped (as then known) in hospitals and informal care for the 
elderly, in line with the enlightenment thesis.2
I think in those early days if you could give them [DHSS] something 
they could actually use, I think that helps cement the relationship. (Mike 
Drummond, in MacKillop et al, 2018)
These early years were crucial in kick-starting some ground-breaking projects with 
wide-ranging impact on healthcare. A key example is the 1971 proposal made by 
three York economists – Culyer, Lavers and Williams – to the Department to develop 
the concept of ‘health indicators’. This marked one of the origins of the QALY, 
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which facilitated the introduction of cost-effectiveness evaluations of treatments and 
the creation of NICE (TNA, MH/166.927, Economics of Medical Care, ‘Health 
Indicators’, March 1971; MacKillop and Sheard, 2018).
Economists in DHSS and economists at York: a special relationship
It is evident that by the mid-1970s, EAO and York economists had already developed 
a ‘special relationship’ between individuals trained in the same discipline. The EAO 
for instance sent civil service job adverts to York academics (CHE archives, JL 
Nicholson letter to Alan Williams, 5 August 1971, ‘Early York Health Projects’ box). 
This departmental strategy of recruiting economists directly from academia rather than 
through the GES continued. For example, Malcolm Rees was recruited from York 
to the EAO in the mid-1980s, Robert Anderson (who worked with Alan Williams 
at York, although not on health specifically) in 1985, and Anita Charlesworth joined 
the DH in 1990 following her MSc at York. It can also be seen in the practice of 
secondments of academics to the Department. These included Ron Akehurst (from 
York, 1975–1977) and Martin Buxton (from Brunel, 1977–1979). 3 These secondments 
allowed economists to advise the Department from within, ‘do[ing] a particular job 
that the DH wanted’, to learn the ropes of how policy was made and how best to 
tailor evidence for it, although some noted that it was very hierarchical compared 
to academia (Academic 1 and 2). They gained experience that enabled them to fulfil 
a key brokerage role when back in academia, especially in terms of understanding 
timescales and how to present information to the Department (CHE 1 and 2; and 
EAO 1 and 2; also see Hanney et al, 2003). 
Some York economists had privileged access and were able to bypass a complex 
departmental hierarchy of levels in order to have a greater impact on policy (Trostle 
et al, 1999). For example, in 1989–1990, Tony Culyer worked directly with ministers 
and administrators during the formulation of the ‘Working for Patients’ White 
Paper, writing briefs for them (CHE 4). The York economist Ken Wright’s work on 
ambulance use ‘went straight into a Departmental policy… within a week or so of 
coming out’ (EAO 3) (York Discussion paper No 2, 1984). According to this EAO 
economist, Wright ‘always seemed to be pottering in and out of the Department’ 
(EAO 3). Maria Goddard’s career illustrates that this arrangement was reciprocal and 
mutually beneficial. After an early research career at York and in the NHS, she was 
then hired by the EAO in 1994 to work in close collaboration with Alan Langlands, 
Chief Executive of the NHS, to implement the 1991 market reforms. In 1996, she 
returned to a senior research fellowship at York. One EAO economist explained the 
value of this movement of expertise:
there was a huge difference in the style of interaction and the effectiveness 
of the interaction, between those who’d seen it from the inside and kind of 
knew, at the worse what they were wrestling against and, at the best what was 
needed and how to get your way, and some who absolutely didn’t. (EAO 2)
Economists from both DHSS and York who were interviewed expressed a feeling of 
mutual understanding. As internal ‘brokers’, EAO economists understood the data 
and research produced by York economists and translated this in policy/departmental 
language understandable by administrators and politicians. They understood the 
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machinery of policy-making better than academics and thus were able to identify 
windows of opportunity and present evidence in ways that would have impact (EAO 
1, 2, 3, interviews). For example, in the 1971 teaching hospitals cost enquiry by the 
Public Accounts Committee, DH economists were aware of ongoing work at York 
on this topic and thus able to signpost this to the Department (EAO 1 and CHE 3). 
Additionally, the Department’s Research and Development Division (RDD) employed 
liaison officers who were specifically tasked with developing the relationship between 
academics/academic centres funded by the DHSS and the Department (DH 1 and 
2, interviews).
This relationship was cultivated in other ways and environments. One important 
mechanism was the Health Economists’ Study Group, founded by Williams and Culyer 
in 1972. Its bi-annual meetings were regularly attended by Whitehall-based economists, 
who used the opportunity to hear about emerging research and new theoretical 
approaches. These two-day meetings quickly developed a distinctive culture and rituals: 
robust (at times brutal) critiques of academic papers, followed (for some participants) 
by long evenings in university bars. Through CHE and HESG meetings, Whitehall 
economists could establish a rapport and trust with academic economists, which was 
critical to how they subsequently involved them in policy-making. As discussed at 
the witness seminar and in individual interviews, many of these relationships became 
real friendships, built on mutual respect for professionalism and intellect. 
A further component of KT was established in 1978, when the DHSS funded 
the first UK training programme in health economics at the University of York. 
This programme was delivered as an MSc in Health Economics specifically to 
build expertise capacity in academia, government and the health service (CHE 4 
and 5). Alan Williams “got in people like Clive Smee [DHSS/DH Chief Economic 
Adviser, 1984–2002] to teach on the MSc and that exposed people like me from 
[an] early stage into the fact that the [EAO] existed and that you could go and work 
in government” (Brian Ferguson, in MacKillop et al, 2018). Karen Bloor from CHE 
added that “Archie Cochrane and Gordon McLachlan [also] used to come and teach 
on the Masters” (in MacKillop et al, 2018). 
Post-1979 research management: the growth of economics in health
Following the 1979 general election which brought in a Conservative government, 
there was an overt change of attitude by research managers towards what some 
interviewees described as a more political model of KT. The University Grants 
Committee was abolished and the Social Science Research Council’s (SSRC) budget 
was cut. The DHSS programme at York’s ISER had been reviewed and confirmed 
the previous day: 
… the next day, the general election happened and basically after that, the 
SSRC was just decimated. Anything with the word ‘social’ in it was decimated 
and the funding was no longer going to be there. The programme was 
given a one-year extension to wind up the work it was doing. (Academic 
1, Interview)
There were also changes to the Rothschild framework and funding for HSR was 
returned to the MRC. Although this move was criticised by some health economists 
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(Williams, 1981), it enabled a new phase of expansion of economics in health policy. 
The growth of New Public Management (NPM) could also be seen to favour the 
adoption of economics in health policy-making, with its focus on cost, marketisation 
and performance indicators (Pollitt, 1993). 
It was in this new political and intellectual context that the idea of creating the 
Centre for Health Economics (CHE) at the University of York was first mooted. 
However, it could also be seen as a competitive response to the creation in 1977 of 
the Health Economics Research Unit (HERU) at Aberdeen with funding from the 
Scottish Office. CHE was inaugurated in 1983, with an initial grant of £478,060 
from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)4 and the DHSS (York 
Borthwick Archives, ‘Future of the ISER’, Council minutes, item 83/111; CHE 
4). According to Clive Smee, the Centre was not only funded for providing policy 
advice and MSc training but also to develop the discipline of health economics and 
to provide new quantitative and qualitative methods for investigating health matters 
(Smee, 2005). CHE was mutually beneficial to academia and policy-makers. For York, 
the six-year rolling contract and funding meant the end of “patching it together with 
ESRC money and constantly [being] threatened with running out of grant” (CHE 4). 
For the  DHSS, it meant an additional source of economics expertise to supplement 
that available from the EAO. Furthermore, the long-term funding meant CHE was 
under an obligation to respond to DHSS requests for assistance, a pattern observed 
by Ettelt et al (2013). As CHE developed in parallel with DHSS policy, it not only 
provided solutions but identified new problems that it could address through research 
(Smee, 2005; TNA MH/82.110). More generally, the creation of CHE was crucial 
in building closer links between academia and government in health economics, 
allowing economists on both sides to gain greater influence. This value was apparent 
to another area of DHSS activity, operational research, where staff envied the access 
to a specialist academic unit (DH3).
CHE aimed for rapid dissemination of its research findings, and regularly produced 
discussion papers before conventional publication in academic journals. Its academics 
also sought to publish their work in health services professional journals. Collaborations 
were formed with government ministers through the production of briefing papers 
for specific draft policies. For example, Alan Maynard worked with the MP David 
Willetts during the GP fundholding formulation in 1989–1991 (DH Archives Burnley, 
GP practice budgets, General, Policy in confidence). According to one interviewee, 
the techniques of economic evaluation fitted in well with the ideological value for 
money thesis of the 1980s (CHE 2). CHE data would be “seized by the politicians, 
particularly where productivity was going up” (CHE 2). These examples support 
Boswell’s substantiation argument (also Ashmore et al, 1989). Although there was 
an agreed principle of freedom to publish, with the DHSS only requiring notice of 
future publications, there is evidence that the Department would sometimes ‘sit on’ 
CHE reports because they were “embarrassing and they [didn’t] want to share that 
with the minister” (CHE 2). This is a good example of how expertise could be used 
as political substantiation (Boswell, 2009). For example, in 1988, CHE published 
comparative data on health authority mortality rates without informing the DHSS, 
leading to outrage from the medical community (Kind, 1988). 
The political ‘substantiation’ that health economics provided can also be seen in 
the development of QALYs, which became politically acceptable in the 1980s at a 
time of increasing health demands and pressure to reduce health spending (MacKillop 
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and Sheard, 2018). The 1970s oil shocks and public expenditure crises, followed by 
the post-1979 context of spending limitations and the growth of NPM, played a 
key role in securing the position of York academics within the community of health 
policy-makers: their concepts of scarce resources, cost-effectiveness, and resource 
allocation formulae chimed with current political values and culture. If we view this 
using Boswell’s substantiation argument, the dominance of York economists allowed 
the DHSS to sideline other actors in the quality-of-life debate, such as medical 
professionals and ethicists (Harris, 1987; Smith, 1987). A key weakness of traditional 
KT theories is their failure to acknowledge and evaluate the role of personalities and 
politics. By politics, we mean the multiple conflicts over meaning which structure 
society and are seen by some critical theories to encompass relations, beliefs, knowledge 
and facts. This factor was demonstrated most effectively through the witness seminar 
held at CHE in October 2017. This brought together eleven key individuals who 
had worked at CHE or in government roles. The easy banter and recollection of 
working relationships suggested that the collaboration between CHE and DHSS/
DH had relied on trust and mutual understanding as much as availability of expertise 
and opportunities. The event also illustrated the politics involved in utilising evidence. 
For example, Roy Carr-Hill, who had helped devise the NHS resource allocation 
formula in the 1980s, reminisced that: 
[I]t turned out [the DH administrator] meant [Margaret] Thatcher didn’t 
like the idea of having an anarchist running the resource allocation formula 
[laughter].
A similar politics of knowledge was present in Scotland, Anne Ludbrook explaining 
that “if the Minister already has a view on something, it’s then very difficult to conduct 
independent analysis and research” (in MacKillop et al, 2018).
Conclusion
This paper has explored KT between academia and government by illustrating DHSS 
civil servants and York economists’ roles, relationships, strategies and tools in health 
policy-making. Following knowledge-driven and problem-solving KT models, 
DHSS civil servants commissioned policy-focused research advice. However, they 
also engaged in other types of KT to impact on research and the NHS, especially 
through training programmes for graduates, developing basic knowledge via funding 
the discipline, and providing briefing, notes and new tools such as QALYs. Academics 
also influenced policy-making more directly. Some helped to formulate policies with 
civil servants and politicians, as illustrated by the rapid adoption of Wright’s research 
on ambulance use and Maynard’s work on the 1989–1991 GP fundholding reforms. 
Yet the ‘impact’ of the York research was more often indirect and slow, requiring time 
and resources from these academics and their allies in the DHSS in order to ‘sink 
in’ and resonate with policy-makers (Davies et al, 2000; Smith, 2013; Weiss, 1977). 
There are limits to the articulation of the traditional KT models, as our data 
demonstrate. The case studies presented here, set within an explicit historical context, 
demonstrate the role of politics in the use of knowledge. These findings support a 
more critical approach to the literature, emphasising the need for robust analysis 
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of how research and policy interact and the importance of multiple influences and 
factors in evidence ‘informing’ policy (Oliver et al, 2014). 
Why does this matter for today? This historical case study has traced a government 
department’s emerging relationship with a group of academics, illustrating the 
increasing number of KT techniques and relationships developing over time. It has 
demonstrated the multiple strategies deployed by both sides in gaining influence 
and making policy. It illustrates how certain strategies, such as the secondment of 
academics to Whitehall, helped bolster the brokerage aptitude of academia. It has 
established that the special relationship between EAO and York economists was a key 
factor in smoothing the translation of economics into policy-making. The presence of 
economists within the DHSS improved this translation further by keeping academics 
informed of the Department’s demands and needs. This research provides findings, 
especially regarding KT strategies and relationships, and mobilises categories which can 
be helpful in reviewing KT relationships in other contexts – policy or geographical 
– and helping researchers and policy-makers to reflect on their own transfer methods 
and issues. It also stresses the need for looking beyond organisations and individuals 
as different ‘subjects’ with distinct characteristics: instead, we emphasised through 
our research how KT strategies and relationships are mobilised interchangeably by 
organisations and individuals, both being capable of agency. This case and similar ones 
could be further developed by drawing on the co-productionist knowledge transfer 
literature (Davies et al, 2005; Denis et al, 2003; Wehrens, 2014), especially to analyse 
instances where non-researchers were directly involved in the conduct of research, 
rather than simply funding or allowing access to research sites (Denis and Lomas, 2003).
What this case also does is to illuminate other, often sidelined, uses of expert 
knowledge in government, notably its politics (Boswell, 2009; Hawkins and Parkhurst, 
2016; Parkhurst, 2016). It demonstrates how economics was politically articulated 
to help legitimise and substantiate the Government’s political goals, for example on 
the introduction of GP fundholding and QALYs. This case emphasises that the use 
of expert knowledge is not objective or value-free. Decisions based on economics 
also had an impact on other actors in this policy community, for example medical 
professionals, who found themselves competing for the attention of policy-makers 
over politically sensitive issues such as the use of QALYs to determine resource 
allocation. This paper has presented a multi-faceted picture of KT, building on a 
rich array of primary data from interviews and archive documents. This historical 
analysis of KT in health policy-making allows us to examine how these strategies 
were established and evolved, and thus to reflect on their aims and interests. It adds 
to the theoretical KT literature by demonstrating the weakness of traditional models 
that do not accommodate chronological or political factors. We thus emphasise the 
need for further historical and contemporary case studies to explore the origins of 
overt KT strategies and to deepen investigation of the genealogy of contemporary 
dominant discourses such as health economics. 
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Notes
1 The SHHD was the Health Department in charge of Scottish affairs, attached to the 
Scottish Office until devolution in 1999.
2  A list of all CHE discussion papers since 1984 is available here: https://www.york.
ac.uk/che/publications/in-house/archive/ 
3 The Health Economics Research Group was created at Brunel by Martin Buxton in 
1981. Buxton’s relationship with the DH was close, delivering the first commissioned 
economic evaluation on heart transplants in 1981.
4 The new name of the Social Science Research Council from 1981.
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